Introduction
A hundred years after tax concessions for charitable contributions were introduced as part of the personal income taxes that many countries enacted during the First World War, these countries continue to debate the appropriate level and structure of tax concessions for charitable gifts. In Australia, where the Income Tax Assessment Act 1915 (Cth) included a deduction for donations to 'public charitable institutions', 1 recent reviews have considered replacing the deduction with tax rebates (or credits) or matching grants. With respect to appropriate deductions, theoretical approaches differ. 16 Although it is widely accepted that an income tax should allow deductions for reasonable expenses that taxpayers must incur for the purpose of producing taxable income, 17 opinion is divided on the extent to which non-income producing expenses should also be deductible. While some support the recognition of such expenses as appropriate deductions in measuring each taxpayer's ability to pay, 18 others reject the deduction of such expenses on the grounds that they are discretionary or otherwise irrelevant to the appropriate definition of taxable income, 19 or inferior to other policy instruments as a way of subsidising these expenses. 20 Yet another approach relies on Henry Simons' definition of personal income 15 Simons, above n 13, 49-50. 16 For a comprehensive overview of alternative approaches, see should not apply to charitable gifts which enter into the consumption of needy recipients (in the case of 'alms for the poor') or provide non-exclusive or public goods and services (in the case of 'philanthropy more broadly defined' to include contributions to hospitals, education and culture). 23 In a similar vein, one Canadian commentator maintains that 'the tax deduction simply removes the tax penalty which would otherwise result if taxpayers critique, though generally not acknowledged, is an assumption about the appropriate tax base, by reference to which deductions for personal expenses are characterised as subsidies. Arguing that tax incentives were functionally equivalent to government spending, Surrey generally criticised tax expenditures as poorly targeted and non-transparent forms of government spending, which increase the complexity of the tax system, distort the intended incidence of the income tax, and often confer the greatest benefit on the highest 41 See, eg, McDaniel, above n 38, 394 (arguing that the reward rationale 'appears to call for a system which increases the reward as the individual sacrifices a greater proportion of his income to charity').
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income for the year. 43 In the United States, for example, the Congressional Budget Office has proposed allowing the charitable contribution deduction only for contributions in excess of two per cent of the donor's adjusted gross income. 44 The Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation (also known as the Carter Commission) similarly considered, but rejected, a floor set at one per cent of the donor's income. 45 Besides targeting the 'reward' to the most generous contributors, such a floor would also reduce administrative costs associated with tax assistance for charitable giving. 46 See, eg, Rendall, above n 28, 159; Goode, above n 17, 165. See also the discussion in Aprill, above n 27, 859-62 (proposing the idea of an income-related floor on deductible charitable contributions as a solution to administrative concerns with the extension of the deduction to non-itemisers in the US).
14 Moreover, as John Colombo suggests, 'the work of social scientists may indicate that providing a material reward for giving may actually decrease the giving rate where part of what individuals want from their donation is the "warm glow" and increased selfesteem from behaving altruistically.' 49 As a result, as a rationale for the tax recognition of charitable contributions, the reward rationale is no more persuasive than the argument that a deduction is necessary to ensure an accurate measure of taxable income.
Subsidising Charitable Activities
A second rationale for subsidising charitable gifts looks not to the act of giving itself, but to the ends that these gifts finance, defending tax incentives for charitable contributions as an indirect subsidy to the activities that are carried on by charitable organisations. In order to understand this rationale and its implications for the design of a tax incentive for charitable giving, it is necessary to explain first why governments might wish to subsidise charitable organisations and second why they might wish to do so indirectly through the personal income tax rather than directly through grants to charitable organizations themselves. 
Rationale for Government Subsidies
Among economists, the charitable sector is generally regarded as a provider of quasipublic goods and services -the essential characteristics of which are non-rivalness, meaning that enjoyment by one person does not preclude enjoyment by another, and nonexcludability, meaning that it is difficult or impossible to exclude a person from enjoying the benefit if he or she refuses to pay for it. 50 Where a good or service is relatively nonrival and/or non-excludable, economic theory suggests that private markets will either oversupply the good or service (in the case of non-rival but excludable goods and services) or undersupply the good or service (in the case of non-excludable goods or services). In either case, the resolution of these 'market imperfections' is one of the main economic justifications for the existence of a public sector which provides these 'public'
goods and services directly, distributing their costs among individual beneficiaries through taxes and other levies.
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In addition to the public sector, the charitable sector represents another response to the existence of market imperfections, providing various goods and services such as education, culture, and religion, the benefits of which are relatively non-rival and/or non- 53 See, eg, Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 5 (suggesting that 'voluntary organizations foster a do-it-yourself culture, which can improve accountability, encourage technological innovation, and promote efficiency in the use of resources, which may be more desirable if government provision is encumbered with a lot of bureaucracy.'). See also Richard Domingue, The Charity 'Industry' and Its Tax Treatment (Minister of Supply and Services, 1995) 3 (arguing that '[a]t a time when attempts are being made to reinvent government, it should perhaps be recognized that social services could be provided much more efficiently by charitable organizations. It could be that communities and local agencies are in a better position to assess and meet these needs economically than government employees working in a capital city far removed from the people they serve.'). 54 See, eg, McGregor, above n 27, 442 (noting that charitable contributions 'relieve the government of some of its responsibilities, and make possible some activities, such as those of a cultural nature, which the government might not feel impelled, or be able, to afford to carry on.').
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traditional public sector, this quasi-public function should be supported by public funds. 55 To the extent that charitable organisations provide goods and services that might otherwise be provided by the public sector, moreover, economic theory supports the subsidisation of these activities in order to prevent their undersupply.
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Rationales for Indirect Subsidies
Although these considerations may provide a rationale for subsidising activities carried on by charitable organisations, they do not explain why these subsidies should take the form of indirect subsidies through the tax system rather than direct subsidies in the form of grants to charitable organisations themselves. Two further rationales are generally offered for these indirect subsidies: (1) that tax incentives may increase the amount of charitable donations by more than the cost of the tax incentive, so that they are a more cost-effective way to subsidise charities than direct government grants; and (2) that indirect subsidies are a more decentralised and pluralistic way to support charities than direct grants, since they enable taxpayers themselves to select the charitable activities and organisations to which they wish to direct public funds. 66 indicating that tax incentives are an inefficient way to fund religious organisations, these conclusions have been challenged by other studies suggesting that the price elasticity of giving to religious organisations is higher than the price elasticity of giving for other purposes. 67 Other studies have suggested that the price elasticity of charitable giving increases as income increases, 68 suggesting that tax incentives directed 21 at high-income earners may be more efficient than tax incentives directed at lowerincome taxpayers, though this conclusion has also been questioned by other studies.
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Finally, although empirical studies do not appear to have confirmed the result, one might expect that donations of capital property may be more responsive to the price of charitable giving than contributions from recurring income from which taxpayers may donate a fixed percentage.
Choice, Pluralism, and Indirect Subsidies
An additional argument for subsidising charities indirectly turns on the decentralised manner in which this subsidy is delivered, through contributions by donors, rather than decisions by government agencies. 70 To the extent that these indirect subsidies allow individuals to select the charitable activities to which they wish to direct support without having to obtain the agreement of a political majority, they are generally preferable to direct grants in promoting the very diversity and innovation that accounts for the charitable sector's unique advantages over the traditional public sector. In addition, although it might be argued that direct matching grants would be as consistent with this Although these arguments may provide a rationale for indirectly subsidising charitable activities through a tax incentive for charitable contributions, they do not clearly define the specific form that this tax incentive should take. 71 See, eg, Brooks, 'Financing the Voluntary Sector', above n 40. 72 See, eg, Bittker, 'The Propriety and Vitality of a Federal Income Tax Deduction', above n 22, 147-52 (concluding that 'I have very little confidence that a system of matching grants could be administered without administrative and congressional investigations, loyalty oaths, informal or implicit warnings against heterodoxy, and the other trappings of governmental support than the tax deduction has, so far, been able to escape'); Goode, above n 17, 163 (considering it 'unlikely' that a system of direct matching grants 'would be as free of undesirable controls or would serve the values of pluralism as well'); John G Simon, 'Charity and Dynasty under the Federal Tax System' (1978) 5 Probate Lawyer 1, 82 (observing that '[t]he tax allowance method has at least the virtue that it does not call upon the government to play an active role in singling out the chosen few'); Krever, above n 29, 21-5 (concluding that 'a matching grant system cannot effectively promote the values of pluralism. If pluralist decision making in the allocation of the government funds for charitable purposes is to be preserved, proposals to replace the current tax expenditure with a matching grant system must be viewed with suspicion.'); Evelyn Brody, 'Charities in Tax Reform: Threats to Subsidies Overt and Covert' (1999) 66 Tennessee Law Review 687, 757 (suggesting that 'one of the reasons why we use the indirect tax subsidy approach is that we are a very heterogeneous society. As such, we find it difficult to agree on which functions to subsidize.').
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To the extent that the subsidy is designed to support the provision of quasi-public goods and services, one approach might be to vary the tax benefit according to the public character of the activity carried on by the charitable organisation, providing larger tax benefits for contributions to organisations that fulfil broad public functions and smaller tax benefits for contributions to organisations providing more limited public benefits.
According to Wayne Thirsk, for example:
it would be desirable to disaggregate within an expenditure category and confer different rates of credit on items that contribute different amounts of social benefit. Not all charitable activities, for example, may yield the same degree of social value, in which case a policy of differentiated tax credits is called for.
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Similarly, on the basis that high-income donors tend to give more to organisations like hospitals, universities and cultural institutions that provide greater social benefits than churches and religious organisations favoured by lower-income donors, 75 some have 74 Thirsk, above n 17, 41-2. See also Hochman and Rodgers, above n 56, 14 (arguing that '[t]he proper level of the tax credit depends … on the "external" content of the benefits that the charity-financed activities confer; it depends, in other words, on the relationship between the marginal evaluations of the primary sharing group, namely voluntary donors, and the community-at-large.'); Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 9 (suggesting that 'we should try to encourage donations to charities that provide goods or services to a large number of consumers'); Hossain and Lamb, above n 64, 6 (suggesting that '[p]ublic policy could be used to tailor tax credit rates to reflect society's preferences and needs by setting unique tax credit rates for the different donation sectors'); Colinvaux, 'Rationale and Changing the Charitable Deduction', above n 10, 1458 (observing that '[i]f a functional or activities-based approach to the tax benefit is the priority, a credit might make more sense than a deduction, perhaps with higher credit percentages (a larger tax benefit) for the preferred type of organization'). 75 For studies suggesting that high-income donors tend to give more to hospitals, universities, and cultural institutions, while low-income donors favour churches and religious organisations, see Taussig 
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argued in favour of a deduction for charitable contributions on the basis that it would provide a larger indirect subsidy to 'more worthy' organisations than a revenue-neutral flat-rate credit.
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Although this approach may be theoretically sound, it is likely to founder on the actual measurement of 'public benefits', which are subject to dispute, 77 and can depend on value judgments that are often difficult to reconcile. 78 More importantly, since an indirect subsidy in the form of a tax incentive is designed to promote pluralism in the allocation of public funds, any decision to favour some activities over others is arguably incompatible with the rationale for a tax incentive as opposed to direct government grants. Indeed, to the extent that pluralism itself is regarded as a public good, it follows 76 
See, Faye Woodman, 'The Tax Treatment of Charities and Charitable Donations since the Carter Commission: Past Reforms and Present Problems"Problems' (1988) 26
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 537, 575 ('Simply, an argument may be made that some institutions are richer contributors to the social, cultural, and intellectual mosaic than others. Hence, it may be possible to justify a system of deduction that is skewed in the direction of the favourite charities of upper-income taxpayers.'). For a 'somewhat less elitist' version of this argument, see Simon, above n 72, 69 (suggesting that 'whether or not wealthy givers are better suited to uphold cultural and intellectual standards, affluent individuals are more likely to be idiosyncratic or unorthodox' and contending that this 'idiosyncrasy and heterodoxy' might 'justify … the inegalitarian charitable deduction in the name of pluralism'). 77 See, eg, Scharf, Cherniavsky and Hogg, above n 50, 28 ('Available evidence … seems to suggest that the activities of the nonprofit organizations and charities typically supported by the rich do not produce higher valued externalities than do those supported by lower income earners. In fact, the converse may be true: universities and cultural organizations are charities that may be viewed as more "local" than churches and religious organizations. Thus larger giving by high income earners should be discouraged on efficiency grounds, while smaller gifts by low income earners should be encouraged.'); Duff, 'Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax', above n 8, 435 ('In a pluralistic society, … who is to say that the public benefits associated with religious activities are any less than those associated with higher education?'). 78 See, eg, Wolkoff, above n 60, 288 (most religious gifts 'help maintain the donors' congregations' and are 'directed at satisfying the needs of the donor, not at satisfying the needs of society at large'); Bromley, above n 24, 14 ('Religious activities are justifiably "charitable" on the basis that they are beneficial to the community as a whole because they contribute to bettering the conduct and character of citizens.').
25 that a tax incentive for charitable contributions should not discriminate among different activities or organisations, except to deny charitable status to organisations the aims or activities of which contradict the values of a free and democratic society. To the extent that governments wish to prefer certain activities or organisations, moreover, they can (and often do) do so through direct grants.
Alternatively, to the extent that the tax incentive is intended to subsidise the charitable sector in a cost-effective manner, the tax incentive might vary according to the price elasticity of the donation, with lesser tax benefits for charitable gifts that are determined to be less price elastic and larger tax benefits for charitable gifts that are determined to be more price elastic. On this basis, some proposals have relied on studies suggesting that high-income taxpayers are more sensitive to the price of charitable giving than lowincome taxpayers to support tax incentives, such as deductions or exemptions on substantial gifts of property, that provide greater tax benefits to high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers. 79 Others have relied on studies suggesting that charitable gifts to religious organisations are less elastic than charitable gifts to health and education to suggest that donations to the former should attract lower tax benefits than donations to the latter.
80 79 See, eg, Productivity Commission, above n 2, G29 (suggesting that 'policies targeted at promoting giving by high-income individuals may be more (treasury) efficient').
The problem with this argument for the design of a charitable contributions tax incentive is threefold. First, as the brief summary of empirical studies above shows, there is little consensus on the relationship between price elasticity of charitable giving and variables such as the type of charitable organisation and the income of the donor. 81 Second, to the extent that the tax incentives for charitable giving provide more generous tax benefits to high-income taxpayers than low-income taxpayers, they raise concerns about the equitable distribution of tax benefits across income classes that must be weighed against the presumed cost-effectiveness of these incentives. Finally, to the extent that tax incentives favour donations to one type of charitable organisation over another, they contradict one of the main objectives of an indirect subsidy for charitable contributions, which is to promote pluralism in the allocation of public funds to the charitable sector.
For these reasons, one might reasonably criticise deductions for charitable contributions, 
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taxation of gains on gifts of property, which provides the greatest tax benefit not only to high-income taxpayers subject to the highest marginal tax rate, but to particularly affluent taxpayers with property that has increased in value. 83 Rather than promoting genuine pluralism, these tax incentives are apt to foster a kind of 'philanthropic paternalism' as a result of which the mix of goods and services provided by the charitable sector is shaped more by an affluent minority than by the community as a whole.
Consequently, as I have argued elsewhere, 84 a tax incentive for charitable contributions should ideally take the form of a tax credit or rebate the value of which does not vary according to the donor's level of income. 85 In addition, the credit should be fully refundable in order to ensure that this subsidy is available not only for donations from donors with tax otherwise payable but also for contributions from donors whose incomes are too low to pay tax. 
Recent Canadian Experience
Like Australia and the United States, Canada used to provide a deduction for charitable contributions, which was first introduced in 1917 for a limited category of donations, and expanded in 1930 to donations to all charitable organisations. 87 In 1988, however, this deduction was converted into a non-refundable credit. The following sections consider the rationale and effects of this tax reform as well as more recent reforms which have exempted gifts of property from tax on capital gains and increased income-related ceilings on the amount that individual taxpayers may claim in respect of charitable gifts.
Conversion of Deduction to Credit
Since a deduction for charitable gifts provides a tax benefit equivalent to the donor's marginal tax rate, it is worth more to high-income donors than low-income donors, resulting in a regressive distribution of the indirect subsidy for charitable activities.
Although the Canadian Royal Commission on Taxation acknowledged this regressivity when it examined the charitable deduction in 1966, maintaining that it 'would propose a system of credits for charitable donations' if equity were the only consideration, 88 the Commission resisted this conclusion on the grounds that 'private philanthropy performs a worthwhile social purpose' and '[t]he credit approach would … tend to stifle charitable 87 Duff, 'Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax', above n 8, 408.
88 Royal Commission on Taxation, above n 45, vol 3, 222 (explaining that '[t]he tax concession would … be related only to the size of the donation and would not also depend upon the income of the taxpayer').
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giving by upper income individuals and families.' 89 As a result, it concluded, 'the fundamental feature of the present system, the deduction of charitable donations from income, should be continued.'
90
In the 1970s and 1980s, however, deductions for charitable contributions came under increasing criticism in Canada and the United States, on the basis that they were regressive tax expenditures that should be replaced by matching grants or tax credits. 91 In 1987, the Canadian federal government accepted these criticisms, announcing that it would amend the Income Tax Act ('ITA') 92 by converting the deduction to a credit that would 'increase fairness by basing tax assistance on the amount given, regardless of the income level of the donor.' 93 Instead of establishing a flat-rate credit, however, the government introduced a two-tiered credit according to which charitable contributions claimed in the year up to $250 would be creditable at the lowest marginal rate while amounts exceeding this threshold would be creditable at the top marginal rate. With respect to the distribution of this federal assistance, analysis of tax return statistics from 1988 indicates that the two-tiered credit was more generous than a deduction for low-income taxpayers, and essentially the same as a deduction for middle-and highincome taxpayers. As Table 1 illustrates, since average contributions by donors with incomes less than $25 000 exceeded the $250 threshold, a portion of these gifts was creditable at the top marginal rate, resulting in a more generous tax benefit than that which would have resulted from a deduction at the 17 per cent federal marginal tax rate applicable to taxpayers with incomes less than $25 000. For taxpayers with incomes above this level, however, the average rate at which charitable contributions were credited differed very little from that rate that would have resulted from a deduction at the federal marginal tax rate, which at the time was 17 per cent on income up to $27 500, 100 Calculated as the aggregate of charitable donations reported by taxfilers in the income category, divided by the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming the charitable donations credit.
101 Calculated as the aggregate value of tax credits received by taxfilers in the income category divided by the number of taxfilers in the income category claiming the charitable donations credit.
102 Calculated as the aggregate value of tax credits received by taxfilerstax filers in the income category divided by the aggregate value of charitable donations reported by taxfilers in the income category.
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26 per cent on income from $27 500 to $55 000, and 29 per cent on income exceeding $55 000.
With an additional incentive for low-income taxpayers to contribute to charitable organisations, one might have expected to see an increase in the average amount and/or frequency of charitable contributions among this income group. As Table 2 indicates, although the average amount contributed by donors with incomes less than $50 000
increased from 1987 to 1988, the percentage of tax filers with incomes less than $50 000 who claimed the credit decreased. More significantly, for taxpayers with incomes greater than $50 000, both the average amount donated as well as the percentage of taxfilers As a result, as might have been expected from a measure that replaced an income-related deduction with a credit based on amounts donated, the reform appears to have shifted the distribution of charitable giving -and tax incentives associated with these gifts -from higher-income donors to lower-income donors. As Table 3 indicates, this pattern endured until the mid-1990s, as average donations continued to increase among lower-income groups, while average donations among higher-income groups continued to decline before eventually recovering to 1987 levels only by 1996. precipitated this general decline, but there is no evidence that the switch from a deduction to a credit was a cause. 
Capital Gains Exemptions on Gifts of Property and Increased Income-Related Ceilings
While the conversion of the charitable deduction into a credit increased average donations by lower-income groups and decreased average donations among higherincome groups, more recent amendments have reversed the trend by exempting gains on gifts of property and increasing income-related ceilings on the percentage of a taxpayer's income that can be sheltered by the charitable credit.
Gifts of property became taxable in Canada in 1972, when the federal government introduced a tax on capital gains, which were not included in the concept of income that Canada inherited from the United Kingdom. Following the recommendation of the Royal Commission on Taxation, the new rules applied to accrued gains on the transfer of capital property, which are deemed to have been disposed of for proceeds equal to fair market value. 106 As a result, it followed that a taxpayer donating property to a charity could claim the full value of the property in computing the amount of the charitable deduction (and later credit) but would have to pay tax on the capital gain resulting from its disposition.
Before the new rules were enacted, concerns were expressed about imposing a tax on gifts of property to charities. 107 According to House of Commons and Senate Committees examining the proposed legislation, gifts of property to charities should not be subject to tax as a capital gain but should be deductible only to the extent of their cost to the donor, not their market value at the time of the gift. 108 Although the federal government initially rejected these proposals, the ITA was amended in 1972, shortly after the new rules came into effect, to allow taxpayers making gifts of property to elect any amount between the cost of the property and its fair market value at the time of the gift, which would apply 106 ITA ss 69(1)(b) (which applies to gifts inter vivos), 70(5) (which applies to capital property transferred at death). 107 See the discussion in Bird and Bucovetsky, above n 39, 23-8. circumstances during this period were probably the most significant contributor to these increases, higher ceilings and exemptions for gifts of property may also have played a part.
As with the shift from a deduction to a credit in 1988, these measures also affected the distribution of charitable donations by income class, but in a way that favoured charitable donations by high-income taxpayers but not low-and middle-income taxpayers. As Table   5 Finally, as Table 7 indicates, the share of charitable donations made and charitable tax credits obtained by low-and middle-income groups declined sharply from 1996 to 2007, while those of the highest income groups increased significantly during this period. Although many factors undoubtedly account for these changes, including increases in the concentration of income and wealth over the last two decades, expanded exemptions for gifts of property and higher income-related ceilings on creditable contributions have also played a significant part. As a result, as Table 8 illustrates, the percentage of charitable contributions made and charitable credits obtained by donors with incomes exceeding $250 000 is significantly larger than their percentage of all taxfilers, donors and even taxable income, while the inverse is the case for donors with incomes less than $50 000. 
Conclusion
Experience in Canada over the past 25 years illustrates the pursuit of two very different approaches to the encouragement of charitable gifts: (1) the replacement of a deduction with a credit, which was intended to 'increase fairness by basing tax assistance on the amount given, regardless of the income level of the donor'; and (2) the introduction of capital gains exemptions on gifts of property and increased income-related ceilings on creditable donations which are intended to 'encourage larger donations to charitable organizations'. While the survey of theoretical literature in this chapter explains the rationales for these different approaches, the empirical analysis demonstrates the effects 46 of these different approaches on aggregate charitable donations and on the distribution of donations and tax benefits among different income classes.
Given my conclusions above about the rationale for tax-assisted charitable giving, it is not surprising that I generally support the 1988 reform that converted the charitable deduction to a credit, but am troubled by more recent reforms introducing capital gains exemptions for gifts of property and increasing income-related ceilings on creditable donations. While the former resulted in a more equitable distribution of charitable donations and charitable tax credits, encouraging a more diverse and pluralistic charitable sector, the latter has accentuated a trend toward philanthropic 'paternalism' in which charitable organisations increasingly come to depend on a small number of extremely affluent donors to support their activities. At the same time, increases in income-related ceilings may allow these donors to effectively opt out of paying most income taxes by making charitable donations that shelter other income from tax, potentially undermining support for the public sector and the tax system more generally.
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At the same time, it is important to recognise that none of these reforms appear to have addressed the greatest risk to a diverse and vibrant charitable sector resulting from a longterm decline in the percentage of taxfilers in all income classes to report contributions to charitable organisations. Financial assistance is, of course, not the only nor always the most valuable way to contribute to a charitable purpose. Individuals may make monetary and non-monetary contributions that they do not (or cannot) claim for tax purposes.
However, apparent declines in the frequency of charitable giving documented in Tables 4   and 6 
